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AMS42
MISSILE

WASHINGTON, JUNE 9, REUTER - THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP AN INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED MULTIPLE WARHEAD MISSILE WITHIN THE NEXT 18 MONTHS, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY.

HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEAPON -- KNOWN AS MIRV -- HAS NOT YET REACHED THE TEST FLIGHT STAGE, A SPOKESMAN SAID. "WE ESTIMATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE MIRV TECHNOLOGY IN 12 TO 18 MONTHS," PENTAGON SPOKESMAN JERRY FRIEDHEIM TOLD REPORTERS. "WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY WILL DEPLOY IT ONCE THEY REACH THAT STAGE...PROBABLY, JUDGING BY OUR EXPERIENCE, THEY WOULD NEED A TEST FLIGHT PROGRAM WITH AN ACTUAL MISSILE BEFORE THEY COULD GO INTO DEPLOYMENT."

THE UNITED STATES IS WELL AHEAD OF THE SOVIET UNION IN MIRV DEVELOPMENT AND BECAUSE OF ITS EDGE HAS ABOUT 5,700 NUCLEAR WARHEADS COMPARED WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S 2,500.

THE PENTAGON HAS SAID BEFORE THE RUSSIANS WERE WORKING ON A MIRV--MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED RE-ENTRY VEHICLE -- PROGRAM AND THEY HAVE CONDUCTED TESTS ON THE LESS COMPLICATED MRV, MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLE.

THE MRV ALSO CARRIES SEVERAL WARHEADS BUT THEY ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY AIMED AT SEPARATE TARGETS. RATHER, THEY ARE SCATTERED AT RANDOM.

FRIEDHEIM WAS BEING QUESTIONED ABOUT A REPORT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ACCORDING TO WHICH DEFENSE SECRETARY MELVIN LAIRD TOLD THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE THE SOVIET UNION HAD FLIGHT TESTED A MIRV MISSILE.
REUTER MB/MJ 1525

UPI-131

ADD 1 RUSSIAN WARHEADS, WASHINGTON (UPI-20)

THE SENATE COMMITTEE, FRIEDHEIM SAID, HAS REQUESTED THAT NO DETAILS OF LAIRD'S REPORT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL THE COMMITTEE TRANSCRIPT OF THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY IS PUBLISHED.

OTHER WELL-PLACED SOURCES, HOWEVER, SAID THE SOVIETS HAVE CONDUCTED A SERIES OF FLIGHT TESTS WITH THE NEW WARHEAD SYSTEM. THEY SAID THESE MISSILE FIRINGS WERE CONDUCTED ENTIRELY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, COVERING LESS THAN THE FULL RANGE OF AN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM), FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES.

ONE SOURCE COMPARED THEM TO TEST FIRINGS OF THE U.S. SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE, IN WHICH EACH FLIGHT MIGHT TEST THE MECHANISM FOR RELEASING EACH BOMB, AND ANOTHER THE NECESSARY GUIDANCE TECHNIQUES.

FRIEDHEIM SAID THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENT WAYS THAT INDEPENDENT STEERING OF BOMBS WITHIN A SINGLE WARHEAD CAN BE ACHIEVED, AND THAT THE SOVIET MIRV MAY BE GREATLY DIFFERENT FROM ITS U.S. COUNTERPART.

"THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT TESTED A MIRV, AS MEASURED AGAINST THE YARDSTICK OF WHAT WE CALL A MIRV," HE SAID. "IT'S NOT OUR KIND OF A MIRV YET, BUT IT IS BEYOND THE SS9 TRIPLET (UNSTEERABLE WARHEAD).

"WE DON'T KNOW IF THEY WANT A MIRV CAPABILITY JUST LIKE WE HAVE. THEY DO NOT HAVE NOW THE KIND OF CAPABILITY WE DO."

FRIEDHEIM SAID SO FAR THE TESTS HAVENOT GOTTEN FAR ENOUGH FOR ANY NEW WARHEADS TO BE TRIED OUT ON THE SOVIET ICBM TEST RANGE, WHICH HAS AN IMPACT ZONE IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CHARLES W. BRAY ALSO COMMENTED ON SOVIET TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING MULTIPLE-INDEPENDENTLY-RETARGETABLE-REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRV):

"IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION, FROM ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, IS CARRYING ON PROGRESS TO DEVELOP MIRV TECHNOLOGY THOUGH THEY ARE A LONG WAY BEHIND THE UNITED STATES. WE KNOW OF NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE YET TESTED A MIRV WARHEAD. THAT IS WHAT AMBASSADOR (GERARD C.) SMITH WAS TALKING ABOUT YESTERDAY. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TESTING A MISSILE WHICH CAN CARRY A MIRV AND TESTING A MIRV WARHEAD."

6-9 BP259

(3D PGH READ LONG LINE X X THE MECHANISM FOR RELEASING EACH BOMB, X X)

LAIRD DISCLOSES SOVIET MIRV TEST TO SENATE PANEL

Committee Is Told Moscow
Is 2 Years Behind U.S. in
Warhead Technology

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 8—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, in secret testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, has disclosed that the Soviet Union is flight-testing a missile that can fire several warheads at individual targets. Thus far, such missiles have remained an American monopoly.

The disclosure that the Russians have begun testing what is known as the MIRV—or multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle—was made by Mr. Laird in answer to a Senator's question on the Soviet advances in this field. His remarks were made known by a Senate source and confirmed by Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon spokesman.

Mr. Laird said, however, that the Russians still lagged about two years behind the United States in warhead technology and that there was no indication that they planned to deploy the multiple warheads.

The question of Soviet technology and intentions has revived because of the agreements limiting strategic arms that were signed in Moscow 13 days ago.

Fewer Missiles for U.S.

In the five year executive agreement limiting the land-based and submarine-launched missiles allowed each side, the United States agreed to accept fewer missiles than the Soviet Union. Administration spokesmen have defended the decision on the ground that the United States, because of its edge in warhead technology, possesses about 57,000 warheads to 2,300 for the Soviet Union.

Critics of the agreement, such as Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, have maintained that once the Russians caught up in technology they could gain an immense edge not only in missile launchers, but in warheads as well.

Previously, the Defense Department had said only that the Russians were working on a MIRV system and had conducted tests with a less complicated multiple warhead known as MRV or multiple re-entry vehicle. MRV warheads, unlike MIRV's are not targeted independently, but are scattered randomly over an area, much like buckshot.

In his statement to Congress in February, Mr. Laird said the Russians "probably have not tested MIRV missiles thus far."

He made his disclosure about the current testing at a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday.

The Russians already possess an edge in the amount of nuclear destruction they could cause.

A few hours before word of the Laird testimony today, Gerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, made a speech in which he asserted that the Soviet Union was so far behind the United States that it had not yet even tested the multiple warhead system.

Mr. Smith, speaking at a foreign policy conference for businessmen, at the State Department made it clear that he supported the view expressed publicly by Mr. Laird a few days ago that the United States must maintain a high level of military spending on programs not barred by the arms agreements.

Mr. Laird, in remarks to reporters Tuesday, said he could not support the agreements unless Congress appropriated funds for a new submarine system, a new long-range bomber aircraft and other strategic weapons not specifically banned. This spending "gives us the opportunity to be in a position where we can bargain from a strong position" in the second phase of strategic arms talks, looking toward a treaty limiting offensive weapons, Mr. Laird said.

Today Mr. Smith said the United States cannot afford to coast along now that initial He said the United States must pay attention and money to

maintaining stability in the strategic arms balance.

He strongly defended the treaty, which limits the Soviet Union and the United States to two defensive missile sites of 100 missiles each.

Mr. Smith, the chief United States negotiator at the strategic arms talks, said the treaty insured that neither side could rationally decide to launch a nuclear attack on the other without a nationwide net of defenses. It is explained, there would be no way to defend against even a weak retaliation.

Asked about the Soviet superiority in numbers of missiles, Mr. Smith said that the United States maintained a warhead lead. But he said that he recognized that the Russians could catch up during the five-year period. For that reason, he said, he hoped that a lasting treaty on offensive weapons, including multiple warheads, could be achieved before the accord runs out.

Mr. Laird, in previous public statements, had indicated that the Russians were working on a multiple warhead. Testifying in public session before the House Appropriations Committee on Monday, he said he expected them to have MIRV capability in 12 to 14 months.

Administration sources said they expected that the arms-limitation agreements would be sent to Congress early next week for action. The Senate

must approve the treaty by a two-thirds vote; both houses must approve the five-year executive agreement by majority vote.

The remarks by Mr. Smith suggested that the Administration had decided not to appear soft toward the Russians and would adopt a "keep the powder dry" stance. But President Nixon, if his speech last week upon his return from Moscow is an example, will stress the long-range hope of accommodation.

For the moment he seems to prefer holding out the possibility of cutting arms expenditures and allowing his aides to stress the need to maintain expensive programs in other fields.

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<p>Remarks: Attached are additional references to Soviet MIRVs in the transcript of Secretary Laird's testimony.</p> <p>We have talked to Braswell and Woolsey, of the Committee staff, who were present during Laird's testimony. Braswell is under the impression that on page 2496, line 7, of the excerpt I sent you earlier, Laird was correctly quoted as referring to MIRVs. Jim Woolsey, on the other hand, feels at this point Laird was referring to MRVs.</p> <p>cc: DDI, A/DDS&T, [REDACTED] D/OSR, FMSAC John M. Maury Legislative Counsel</p>							
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Since the two excerpts of Laird's testimony sent you earlier, I find a third passage of possible significance which is attached. I have called this to the attention of Jim Woolsey, of the Committee staff, who was present during Laird's testimony and he is struck with the references on pages 2464 (which I sent you earlier) and 2526 (attached) to the "stellar initial guidance" system. Woolsey infers that Laird is making a connection between MIRV and SIG and hopes we can get back to Defense and find out what Laird was trying to say or how he has been briefed on these matters.

John M. Maury
Legislative Counsel

P.S. Woolsey just called again to say that Jerry Friedhein is trying to clarify the situation by putting out word that Laird means to say that the Soviets are "definitely working on the technology" for MIRV. Woolsey feels that Laird is creating serious confusion on an important subject and he very much hopes we can get some info from our contacts in Defense as to what Laird is talking about and pass the results to Woolsey in strict confidence.

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Remarks: On the basis of a very quick scan of the 153 page transcript, the attached seems to cover the portions bearing on the MIRV question. We will examine the remaining pages more closely and let you know if there is anything further. <div style="background-color: black; width: 200px; height: 40px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> cc: <div style="background-color: black; width: 150px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> JOHN M. MAURY S: <div style="background-color: black; width: 150px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> legislative Counsel Bruce Clarke					
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